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The Iraqi People Speak: Part Three, The U.S. Role

 

This posting will address a March 2008 poll of the Iraqi people. Identification of source Material follows below.

In most cases, the relative change in opinion dynamics noted here is a comparative to February 2007. This comparative is intended to mirror the changes in Iraqi perceptions that are likely associated with the U.S. Surge in troop levels and strategic redirection. For simplicity sake and as a more general basis for analysis the better or somewhat better responses are combined and compared to the combined worse or much worse ratings.

The U.S. Role:

There are a variety of disconnects and conflicts in Iraqi opinion related to the U.S. role in Iraq. It is likely that reasonable observers would expect that to be the case. The situation is complex and occurs within the context that no country or people “enjoy” the reality of an occupation, most especially a Muslim country occupied by a Christian country. There is a genuine fear that historical events could repeat themselves. However, there is also a sense that “we are where we are” and the need exists to accept certain realities to motivate improvements.

In light of U.S. difficulties in terms of service delivery and economic development, the favorability ratings related to “U.S. carrying out their responsibilities in Iraq” question are predictable but represents an improving trend line. In 2007, the “very/quite good job” rating was 24%, currently improved to 29%. However, in terms of the worst rating category, “very bad job”, U.S. ratings have improved from 46% “very bad” to 35% “very bad”, a 24% improvement in a year’s time.

The numbers of Iraqis that support the U.S. presence has remained consistent, 22% in 2007 and 26% in 2008. Those that oppose U.S. presence have moved from 78% to 72% currently. The improvement in U.S. presence numbers is statistically, not material within the context of the opposed relationship despite the marginal improvement.

However, and here is where disconnects begin to appear; only 38% of Iraqis want the U.S. out now, about half of the number that opposes the U.S. presence. There appears to be a sense of real politic present in Iraqi thinking. 62% of Iraqis want the U.S. to remain in Iraq under a variety of circumstances ranging from “until security is restored” to “never leave” with “never leave” representing only 1% of the responses. Iraqis clearly want the U.S. to leave but they do not want the U.S. to leave them in a mess. The percentage of Iraqis that want the U.S. to leave immediately has declined from 47% in August of 2007 to the current 38%.          

More disconnected opinion is present when the question of what the security situation would be the case if the U.S. left Iraq entirely. Nearly half, 46% think the security situation would actually improve and only 29% see it getting worse. 

Disconnects deepen; when asked whether the U.S. should or should not play a role in specific areas of responsibility in Iraq the responses illustrate the seriously conflicted opinions of Iraqis:

Should the U.S. provide weapons and training to the Iraqi Army, 76% say yes. 

Should the U.S. provide financial aid for reconstruction, 73% say yes.

Should the U.S. provide ongoing security assistance related to Iran 68% say yes. Should the U.S. provide ongoing security assistance related to Turkey, 66% say yes.

Should the U.S. participate in operations against Al Qaeda and foreign Jihadists, 80% say yes! 

The Iraqis appear to have concluded that while their own security forces are improving they are not fully capable of responding to the threats that have presented themselves.

The Iraqis want the U.S. out but not right away and certainly not right now! It is clear that they have both a desire to see the U.S. out and a clear perception of the regional threats that an insecure Iraq would face from a variety of sources in the absence of a U.S. presence. 

Iraqis have evolved a definitive opinion of what Al Qaeda will represent should Al Qaeda be allowed to reestablish itself as a major force in Iraq. Iraqis are clearly rejecting that eventuality while welcoming ongoing U.S. participation in defeating Al Qaeda.

Perhaps, the seriously conflicted opinions regarding the U.S. role and the trend lines associated with those opinions reflect a number of dynamics. It could be that Iraq is exhausted by conflict, terrorism, sectarian issues and are seeing their way clear to accept the conditions as the most likely path to stability. It could also be the case that the changes in U.S. strategy both militarily and diplomatically represent an evolving U.S. presence that is not acceptable, just more acceptable. More acceptable is likely all we could have expected in a year’s time.

Source: D3 Systems of Vienna VA. & DA Research Ltd or Istanbul Turkey. for ABC News, The BBC, ARD and NHK.

Interviews were conducted in Arabic from a random national sample of 2,2228 Iraqis aged 18 and up. Statistical confidence level represented at 95%. 

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