This posting will address a March 2008 poll of the Iraqi people. Identification of source Material follows below.

In most cases, the relative change in opinion dynamics noted here is a comparative to February 2007. This comparative is intended to mirror the changes in Iraqi perceptions that are likely associated with the U.S. Surge in troop levels and strategic redirection. For simplicity sake and as a more general basis for analysis the better or somewhat better responses are combined and compared to the combined worst or much worst ratings.

Security:

When asked to identify the single biggest problem in your life 25% of Iraqis identified one of five security related issues in the poll. 24% identified economic issues and 15% utility delivery. Of the 32 response categories, 24 showed results and only two reached double digits: electricity and unemployment. The security concerns were equally mixed with no dominant response in any one category as it related to the individual. 

When the same question was asked in terms of the country as a whole the identification of security issues showed an increase to 38% followed by 11% of the respondents concerned about regional foreign influence as the major problem facing the country. 

Interestingly, only 6% pointed to U.S. presence as the major issue facing the country. Of the double digit responses both were related to security, one in terms of general security and the other related to terrorism. These two concerns represented 25% of the responses. While other issues are clearly of concern to Iraqis they seem to be aware that improved security will form the context within which other issues must be addressed. They also appear to be identifying terrorism as a primary issue. It is fascinating that the perception of terrorism as the major issue facing the country is double the responses related to U.S. presence as a primary problem. There were 33 categories of possible answers with 26 showing results.

In comparative terms when asked about local security conditions 62% identified the situation as good. The prior year that was response was 47%. Those responses represent a 36% improvement over the perception that existed a year prior. Another point of interest is that the percentage of Iraqis who identified the local security situation as “very bad” dropped from 32% in February of 2007 to 12% in March of 2008, the “very bad” rating improved by 167% over a year’s time.

Interesting dynamics also appear when Iraqis are asked who shares the blame or credit for the security situation (these comparatives are March 2008 vs. August 2007).   There is a clear progression in these comparatives: The overall context of the question is that In August of 2007 72% of Iraqis identified the security situation as improved. In March of 2008 62% thought it had improved over the conditions present in August indicating a reasonably strong trend of positive momentum and consistent with the “very bad” rating in the prior paragraph. 

Who is responsible for the improvement? Of those that identify the situation as improved, 31% identify the Iraqi Army and Police with another 26% saying the Iraqi Government resulting in 57% identifying government institutions as the responsible parties for the improvement. While there is no prior period comparative, a growing confidence in Iraqi instructions can only serve to help stabilize the security conditions further. Another 8% identify the Awakening Councils, only 5% identify the Mahdi Army as a responsible party. As you might note there is 30% left, that 30% was identified in the poll as “Other”. As the U.S. forces are not specifically identified, it may be reasonable to assume that “Other” is actually U.S. forces. If that assumption is correct the combination of the U.S. forces and Iraqi institutions are perceived to represent 87% of the improvement in security conditions.

On the other hand, of those who identified the situation as worst, only 20% identify U.S. forces and operations as the culprit. Combining responses that include Militias, Political Parties and their Militias and the Iraqi Government result in 51% of Iraqis blaming those entities for a worsening of the security situation. Al Qaeda is blamed by 9% of respondents and neighboring countries by 6% of respondents.  

Interestingly, the comparatives to 2007 related to confidence in the Iraqi Army and Police is essentially the same now, within the margin of error. This, despite polling that demonstrates strong feelings that the Army and Police are responsible for the improvement in the general security situation.

While confidence in U.S. forces occurs at very low numbers, there is a change here as well. In 2007, 18% expressed confidence in U.S. forces with 52% expressing “no confidence at all”. In 2008, the confidence number rose to 20% and the “no confidence at all” declined to 46%. Small improvements to be sure but somewhat representative of a trend as the “no confidence at all” rating in 2005 was 55%. 

Local Militias are taking a hit in Iraqi public opinion. Confidence in local militias has dropped from 36% to 22% a decline of 63% in that category. The “no confidence at all” rating for local Militias has gone from 38% in 2007 to 47% in 2008 a 24% decline. This, in combination with other issues seems to represent a moving away from dependence on local militias as a failed approach that has to evolve from a focus on local security to a greater reliance on existent security institutions.

It is also interesting to note that the confidence in Awakening Councils is reasonably strong with 56% expressing confidence. It is clear that Awakening Councils and the Militia’s are viewed very differently with Awakening Councils more than doubling the favorability ratings of Militias. Considering that, the Awakening Councils were established within the last year these favorability ratings have to be viewed as very strong especially in contrast to the perception of Militias. 

In light of difficulties in terms of service delivery and economic development, the favorability ratings related to “U.S. carrying out their responsibilities in Iraq” question are somewhat predictable but also represent an improving trend line. In 2007, the “very/quite good job” rating was 24% currently improved to 29%. However, in terms of the worst rating category, “very bad job”, U.S. ratings have improved from 46% “very bad” to 35% very bad, a 24% improvement in a year’s time.

There were a number of questions specifically related to the increased U.S. troop levels in Iraq. These numbers compare polling from August of 2007. The question of security conditions specifically in the areas where additional troops were sent was asked. In 2007, 18% felt that security was better and 70% thought it worse. Currently 36% view security as better and 53% worse, an essential 17 point change from worse to better.

The question was also asked related to “other areas of Iraq” in this case the better rating went from 12% to 30%, the worse rating from 68% to 49%.

The question relating to the presence of U.S. forces’ impact on security in general shows a disconnect as they compare to the prior questions. The better/worse change since August of 2007 shows favorable changes of 9-11 points.

This might be explained by the ratings enjoyed by the Awakening Councils in the context of the understandable desire to identify Iraqis as primary responsible parties for security improvements. 51% of Iraqis feel these Councils have improved security with only 16% of the opinion that they have worsened the security situation. 31% feel they have had no impact, which is understandable in light of the fact that they were initially focused on a single province, and their growth in other areas is only now beginning to escalate.

The bottom line? Iraqis perceive their conditions to be improving as related to security. They are clearly reluctant to provide any considerable measure of credit to U.S. forces. This dynamic is fully understandable in light of the fact that our invasion set the stage for 4 years of essentially worsening security conditions as the rise of Al Qaeda in Iraq, Iranian and Syrian influence and weapons combined with the presence of foreign fighters to create horrific circumstances on the ground. The context also exists that an essentially Christian nation is currently responsible for Iraqi security and this circumstance is grating on Iraqis as it would be on us were the circumstances reversed. 

However, the fact that favorability numbers for U.S. involvements are improving at all in light of the inherent reluctance to view the U.S. in a positive fashion is, hopefully, telling and has set the stage for additional improvements which should they occur could represent a geometric progression of opinion.

The Iraqis are clearly rejecting terrorism as evidenced by their definition of threats and the favorability of Awakening Councils who have been in the front lines of banishing Al Qaeda in Iraq from their regions of responsibility.

From the Iraqi point of view things have improved in the past year in some cases dramatically. It would be intellectually disingenuous to separate the dynamics of The Surge and the associated change in strategy from the Iraqi perception of improvement.

Source: D3 Systems of Vienna VA. & DA Research Ltd or Istanbul Turkey. for ABC News, The BBC, ARD and NHK.

Interviews were conducted in Arabic from a random national sample of 2,2228 Iraqis aged 18 and up. Statistical confidence level represented at 95%.  

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