This posting will address a March 2008 poll of the Iraqi people. Identification of source Material follows below.

In most cases, the relative change in opinion dynamics noted here is a comparative to February 2007. This comparative is intended to mirror the changes in Iraqi perceptions that are likely associated with the U.S. Surge in troop levels and strategic redirection. For simplicity sake and as a more general basis for analysis the better or somewhat better responses are combined and compared to the combined worse or much worse ratings.

Internal Politics:

There are a number of contextual opinions that appear to form the general construct of Iraqi opinion. The question of how the government should be structured sees 66% of Iraqis favoring a unified Iraq with a strong central government in Baghdad, a year ago that number was 58%. The numbers related to confidence in the national government has remained essentially the same over the past year with 48% expressing some level of confidence. In terms of Prime Minister al-Maliki’s job performance the numbers are also essentially flat to a year ago with a 40% approval rating. Keep in mind that a 40% plurality in the Iraqi Parliamentary system is likely sufficient to maintain power. Overall favorability ratings for the government as a whole have also remained essentially static. Iraqis see very little progress and express some serious questions about the potential effectiveness of the central government. 

The opinion log jam continues when Iraqis are asked if the government is willing to make the necessary compromises to bring peace and security to the country this questions results in what is an essential 50/50 split between willing and not willing to do what is necessary.

However, questions related to conditions for political dialogue show low favorability opinions but accelerating trends. 21% say conditions for dialogue are better, up from 10% in August of 2007, conditions being worse has seen a dramatic shift, in August of 2007 fully 70% of respondents identified conditions for dialogue as worse currently 43% are of that opinion. The perception of the ability of the Iraqi government to do it’s work has also improved from 12% to 25% with a similar change in associated negatives.

Iraqi opinion related to the acceptability of attacking U.S. and Iraqi forces has seen a dramatic shift. In August of 2007 57% of Iraqis thought it acceptable to attack U.S. forces, currently 42% see it that way. Only 4% of respondents opined that it was acceptable to attack Iraqi forces. This opinion, to some degree, further represents Iraqi opinions related to violence and terrorism.

Sectarian issues bear interesting dynamics. 89% of Iraqis feel that Sunnis should participate in future elections.   69% wanted mid or low level Baathists to be allowed to take government jobs. A clear confluence of opinion.

On the question of sectarian segregation 92% of Iraqis identified segregation as a negative dynamic and 88% feel that the return of displaced Iraqis should be associated with a reinstatement of their prior property rights.

While sectarian segregation issues show an egalitarian instinct the surveys also showed that sectarian identification is, and will likely remain, exceptionally strong. While Iraqis are not in fear of having friends of another sect they will not, in overwhelming numbers, allow their children to marry out of either the Sunni or Shiite sects.

The clear issue for Iraq beyond the evaluation of benchmarks and other artificial standards is to find the common ground between secular institutions and religious identity. To find this weight squarely on the shoulders of a new democracy appears to be daunting to the Iraqis. However, there is nowhere else in the Middle East that stands more of a change to make it happen.   

Throughout the Middle East, fledgling democratic, human rights and accountability movements face this same challenges, in microcosm as does Iraq. The question of how to incorporate Islamic values into a modern, accountable structure of governance and jurisprudence. Many regional eyes are on Iraq, some in anticipation of the impact of success and others in fear of that potential success. For the U.S. to be seen, in the end,  as the midwife of a successful Iraqi democracy would send the most powerful message possible to repressive regimes in the region.

The Middle Eastern political landscape is very much about messages, hints, shadows of meanings and symbolism. The power of a stable Iraq sends many messages and powerful points of symbolism. In the best case it is the locus for change in a region desperately in need of it; in the worst case it reinforces the fear that the evolution of democratic institutions is either not possible or simply too costly.      

Source: D3 Systems of Vienna VA. & DA Research Ltd or Istanbul Turkey. for ABC News, The BBC, ARD and NHK.

Interviews were conducted in Arabic from a random national sample of 2,2228 Iraqis aged 18 and up.  Statistical confidence level represented at 95%.