This posting will address a March 2008 poll of the Iraqi people. Identification of source Material follows below.

In most cases, the relative change in opinion dynamics noted here is a comparative to February 2007. This comparative is intended to mirror the changes in Iraqi perceptions that are likely associated with the U.S. Surge in troop levels and strategic redirection. For simplicity sake and as a more general basis for analysis the better or somewhat better responses are combined and compared to the combined worse or much worse ratings.

General Conditions:

The changes in Iraqi perceptions of their living conditions and the associated expectations for the future is as crucial a dynamic in evaluating the overall impact of recent efforts by the U.S. and Iraqi Governments as can be. If the perception of improvement in general conditions remain static, the security strategy fails and opens the door for the Iraqi people to pursue more draconian options. The prior posting addressed security specific issues; there can be no doubt that what follows is very much integrated with those perceptions.

The context of Iraqi perceptions is reasonably represented by the first survey question; “In your life, are things better or worse?” 54% say better as compared to 39% a year ago, a 38% improvement. Those responding that their personal conditions are “very bad” declined from 28% to 16%. The general “bad” categories in 2007 saw 60% of Iraqis falling into that category, today that number is 45%. It can be argued that these are not exceptional results. However, they can also be fairly judged as a major movement for a year’s time. That movement is especially striking in the context of polling done in 2005 that saw 67% of Iraqis feeling that there circumstances were highly unfavorable.  Versus 2005, there is an improvement of 318% in the worst rating categories.

Also telling are Iraqi expectations for a year from now. A year ago, that question was responded to favorably by 39% of respondents today 54% of Iraqis expect things to be better in their personal lives a year from now.

Non-security concerns related to how Iraqis see the major issues in their personal lives are dominated by economic and utility delivery issues. Assuming that the 8% growth projected for the Iraqi economy actually materializes and that the security conditions continue to improve the economic issues should mitigate over the next year. The current and expected economic growth in Iraq is a likely the basis for the optimism noted above. Utility distribution remains an issue of basic and persistent concern and requires a solution as a foundation for continuing improvement in the overall perception of the effectiveness of the Iraqi government.  It should also be expected that insurgent elements would attempt to insure slow progress on these issues. Utility distribution, sanitation, clean water and street rubble are concerns with electricity being primary. 

When asked if things would be better for the country in a year the opinion change was favorable by 15% and the “much worse” category declined from 13% in 2007 to 7% in 2008. 

The Iraqis seem to be connecting their personal circumstances to the overall conditions in the country. The importance of this connected perception is supportive of a possible mitigation of tribal focus and recognition that Iraq as an independent country is in fact viable.

While Iraqis seem to be reasonably optimistic about the short-term future, they are less so in the context of questions related to whether or not things will be better for their children. Compared to last year there was only an 18% improvement related to whether Iraqis feel their children will be better off than they are. However, there has been a 33% decline in those responding that their children will be worse off. The number of those that felt that it would be “about the same” grew by 24%. This is somewhat, inconsistent with their short-term view but in light of the fragile nature of progress and the remaining threats it is not difficult to rationalize and appreciate.

When asked about general conditions for the country as a whole, favorability ratings also improved from 35% in 2007 to 43% in 2008.   There was, again, a steep decline from 28% who believed things were “very bad” to 20% who thought so. 

The survey addresses a long list of specific areas of opinion with reasonably consistent results in the context of the general opinions represented in preceding sections. There are, however, some notable and important exceptions. Local schools favorability ratings improved from 43% to 63% in a year’s time, an improvement of 47%. Basic availability of household goods improved from 38% to 65%, family economics improved from 36% favorable to 57% favorable. Nearly a third of respondents said their family economic situation had improved over the past year. It makes one wonder how many countries have a third of their population representing improving personal economic conditions over the past year? Granted, comparatives begin from a low value but this set of responses is crucial to the overall Iraqi perception of improvement.

There are key questions that mirror the U.S. debate over Iraqi benchmarks, three are addressed here. The Iraqi perceptions related to a legislative resolution related to sharing Oil profits sees 53% of the opinion that the legislature is willing to do so and 46% thinking not. Reconciliation between ethnic and religious groups is a 50/50 proposition within the margin of error and reduction of corruption tilts slightly to the opinion that the legislature is unwilling to do what is necessary.   

It seems clear that confidence in local institutions exceeds confidence in the central government. Given the overall dynamics of the past four years, it is reasonable to assume that Iraqis are in a wait and see mode relative to the effectiveness of the central government on these issues. Considering the movement in other categories over the past year the Iraqi government seems to be lagging behind grass roots movements. There have been a number of indications over the past year that grass roots reconciliation would lead, not follow, the reconciliation process and it appears that this survey supports that perception.

There is a clear desire by Iraqis to remain where they are. The question asked within the security context was whether or not they would move to another area of Iraq saw 78% saying they would not. A similar question related to moving to a different country saw 64% as satisfied with Iraq. Of those that said, they would move to another country only half actually had any plans to do so. Interesting as well, when asked is Iraqis who fled the violence should return now 54% responded that it was not the right time for them to do so. 

As was the case with security issues, Iraqis see conditions improving but are reluctant to project the improvement far into the future. There is a clear concern with central government leadership and a degree of skepticism related to the potential effectiveness of the current government. Considering the number of factions present in Iraq this concern is likely well founded.

There was no polling, as was the case with security issues, about who deserved blame or credit, therefore some degree of blind interpretation is required. It is likely not a stretch to posit that grassroots and local efforts are more favorably viewed than are the efforts of the central government. Again, it does not appear possible to separate the positive impact of the U.S. anti insurgency strategy from the perceptions of improvements in general conditions. 

It is also the case that only a short time ago the Iraqi government began to mirror U.S. efforts to focus more specifically on local issues as they reorganized their own reconstruction efforts under a new cabinet officer.

It appears that Iraqis see some light at the end of this long tunnel but are reluctant to give in to overly optimistic expectations for the future. 

Source: D3 Systems of Vienna VA. & DA Research Ltd or Istanbul Turkey. for ABC News, The BBC, ARD and NHK.

Interviews were conducted in Arabic from a random national sample of 2,2228 Iraqis aged 18 and up. Statistical confidence level represented at 95%.