The ironies of the political season continue to mount with Rev. Wright providing the latest in the series. 

Recent appearances by Rev. Wright appear to be an almost deliberate effort to put a stake in the political heart of Senator Obama. Some combination of being asked not to give the invocation at the Obama champagne kick off,  Obama’s speech on race in Philadelphia or the mild stepping away from Rev. Wright’s views by the Senator have apparently infuriated Rev. Wright. 

Much talk about Rev. Wright’s ego being out of control, or his need for an egocentric self-defense. Adding to the storm Rev. Wright’s comments during his speeches and the Question & Answer periods were; dismissive, curt and in no small measure, arrogant. These comments were clearly, on the verge of, if not certifiably extremist. Marines analogous to Roman Centurions, Rev. Farrakhan, who spoke in praise of Hitler, as one of the most important voices of the century and on it went, direct and unapologetic. 

Could this be Senator Obama’s worse case scenario of instant Karma as he tries desperately to get past concerns centered on Rev. Wright and the potential damage it does to the voting block where he is the weakest, white working class voters. Why does Rev. Wright feel the need to engage in this? What, no pride in the first potential Black Presidential candidate? No support for this effort, why, why, why?

The pundits and talking heads have, wait for it, …. gotten it wrong. They choose to focus on symptoms and the “political” aspects of the story when the answer likely goes much deeper and by self-applied media standards deeper is danger.

The answer goes to Rev. Wright’s theological background and Black Liberation Theology. In Rev. Wright’s theology, the speech on race in Philadelphia was unacceptable on a number of levels. The acceptance that white people may have valid points of perspective and frustration would be unacceptable to Rev. Wright’s theology. The idea of a black man serving as president of a racist white nation is, to this theology, nothing more than the most significant sell out of all time. On Monday Rev. Wright found it necessary to reveal that he told Obama that if Obama won the election “on November 6^th “I’ll be coming after you”.   

Quoting Rev. James Cone, as Rev. Wright frequently does;  “ To be Christian is to be one of those whom God has chosen. God has chosen black people”. More from Dr. Cone….”It is too easy to say Racism is not my fault….insofar as white do-gooders tolerate and sponsor racism in their educational institutions, their political, economic ands social structures, their churches and in every other aspect of American life, they are directly responsible for racism.” And another “The white structure of this American society, personified in every racist, must be at least part of what the New Testament meant by demonic forces.” There appears to be no consideration of progress and no room for anything other than an empirical reading of current conditions. Any racism is endemic racism although black racism is forgiven in this theology because blacks have not been in the position to apply racist force and cultural superiority. A broad view of white racism coupled with a very narrow view of black racism. One forgiven one not.

By extension, this theology insists that if you are white in America you are a demonic force, no matter your personal struggles or sensitivities to racism.  Back to Rev. Cone, “There is no use for a God who loves white oppressors the same as oppressed blacks……What we need is the divine love as expressed in black power, which is the power of blacks to destroy their oppressors, here and now, by any means at their disposal. Unless god is participating in this holy activity, we must reject God’s love”. This point of view is strangely familiar to Islamic Jihadist rhetoric, destroy all those that do not accept God’s word as we have interpreted it or who reject the God of our faith! 

This view has seen a significant number of supporters and apologists for Rev. Wright within the black church community. In fact, prior to yesterday afternoon clear criticism and renunciation of this view was hard to find on your early evening news programming. However, the justifications still outnumbered the recriminations with one black minister referring to Rev. Wright as a prophet in the prophetic traditions of the Old Testament.

In all honesty, a reasonably well educated, aware person simply cannot deny the presence of racism in America. However, that same person will, typically, also be capable of identifying progress. It’s not 1785 anymore. The question may be whether or not white racism is best fought by theologically supported black racism?         

Rev. Wright’s comments are expressions within a context. The context is his commitment to Black Liberation Theology and the expressions are a representation of that belief system. In Rev. Wright’s world, what Obama is attempting to do is not a positive it’s a negative, because Obama has opted for the requirements of politics over the tenants of theology. 

In the context of the Clinton campaign’s opposition research that produced kindergarten missives by Mr. Obama, what else might they have on Mr. Obama? The question gains momentum when looking back on prior and current Clinton tactics with opponents.

Supposing that opposition research has come up with “more stuff” on Mr. Obama, Hillary has a problem. The problem is fingerprints, during an active campaign the “more stuff ” cannot have Hillary’s fingerprints on what ever the “more stuff” might be. Add to that the now predictable reactions by the Obama wing of the media establishment to even minor criticisms and difficult questions, further add the ever present possibility of being charged with racism and Hillary, while possibly having “more stuff”, can’t use it while the campaign lingers on. That does not, however,  mean she can’t use it at all.

If Mrs. Clinton hangs on through the primaries, win or lose we eventually reach the down time between the last primary and the convention. What if the “more stuff” surfaces then? It’s too late for primary voters to be influenced positively or negatively, they’ve already voted.  The super delegates maintain the option to change their minds up until the final bell. Public opinion could create a wave of discontent entering the convention. The unfortunate reality is that subtle, camouflaged racism still exists and many voters may be looking for some reason not to support Mr. Obama. Super delegates will become more concerned with the general election than with Mr. Obama’s charisma. Faced with the potential choice of a guaranteed defeat with Mr. Obama or a fighting chance with Hillary they’ll take the fighting chance.

This scenario is, of course, predicated on the presence of “more stuff”.   If the Clinton campaign worked Mr. Obama back to kindergarten, it’s reasonable to assume they knew about Reverend Wright, and William Ayres. It is therefore reasonable to assume there could be “more stuff”. The fact that conservative media is all over these issues does not necessarily mean they uncovered it or exposed it. A tip could come from anywhere. Was there an identification of who actually posted Reverend Wright’s sermon on YouTube?  That could be telling, but our crack population of investigative journalists has apparently not gone there.

Mr. Obama, wisely, in his book preemptively confesses to prior questionable behaviors and indiscretions. Did he cover them all; is there more? If there is, we will have to wait until June and the completion of the final primary to hear about it.

Does anyone question the Clinton instinct to do whatever it takes to win? Despite charisma, change and energized new young voters the final verdict could be the result of politics as usual. Who plays that game better? 

From the Clinton perspective it may not be about Florida and Michigan. Those issues could be no more than a red herring to buy the necessary amount of time to get to June and the “stuff”.  It just might explain why Hillary won’t quit. 

 

This posting will address a March 2008 poll of the Iraqi people. Identification of source Material follows below.

In most cases, the relative change in opinion dynamics noted here is a comparative to February 2007. This comparative is intended to mirror the changes in Iraqi perceptions that are likely associated with the U.S. Surge in troop levels and strategic redirection. For simplicity sake and as a more general basis for analysis the better or somewhat better responses are combined and compared to the combined worse or much worse ratings.

Internal Politics:

There are a number of contextual opinions that appear to form the general construct of Iraqi opinion. The question of how the government should be structured sees 66% of Iraqis favoring a unified Iraq with a strong central government in Baghdad, a year ago that number was 58%. The numbers related to confidence in the national government has remained essentially the same over the past year with 48% expressing some level of confidence. In terms of Prime Minister al-Maliki’s job performance the numbers are also essentially flat to a year ago with a 40% approval rating. Keep in mind that a 40% plurality in the Iraqi Parliamentary system is likely sufficient to maintain power. Overall favorability ratings for the government as a whole have also remained essentially static. Iraqis see very little progress and express some serious questions about the potential effectiveness of the central government. 

The opinion log jam continues when Iraqis are asked if the government is willing to make the necessary compromises to bring peace and security to the country this questions results in what is an essential 50/50 split between willing and not willing to do what is necessary.

However, questions related to conditions for political dialogue show low favorability opinions but accelerating trends. 21% say conditions for dialogue are better, up from 10% in August of 2007, conditions being worse has seen a dramatic shift, in August of 2007 fully 70% of respondents identified conditions for dialogue as worse currently 43% are of that opinion. The perception of the ability of the Iraqi government to do it’s work has also improved from 12% to 25% with a similar change in associated negatives.

Iraqi opinion related to the acceptability of attacking U.S. and Iraqi forces has seen a dramatic shift. In August of 2007 57% of Iraqis thought it acceptable to attack U.S. forces, currently 42% see it that way. Only 4% of respondents opined that it was acceptable to attack Iraqi forces. This opinion, to some degree, further represents Iraqi opinions related to violence and terrorism.

Sectarian issues bear interesting dynamics. 89% of Iraqis feel that Sunnis should participate in future elections.   69% wanted mid or low level Baathists to be allowed to take government jobs. A clear confluence of opinion.

On the question of sectarian segregation 92% of Iraqis identified segregation as a negative dynamic and 88% feel that the return of displaced Iraqis should be associated with a reinstatement of their prior property rights.

While sectarian segregation issues show an egalitarian instinct the surveys also showed that sectarian identification is, and will likely remain, exceptionally strong. While Iraqis are not in fear of having friends of another sect they will not, in overwhelming numbers, allow their children to marry out of either the Sunni or Shiite sects.

The clear issue for Iraq beyond the evaluation of benchmarks and other artificial standards is to find the common ground between secular institutions and religious identity. To find this weight squarely on the shoulders of a new democracy appears to be daunting to the Iraqis. However, there is nowhere else in the Middle East that stands more of a change to make it happen.   

Throughout the Middle East, fledgling democratic, human rights and accountability movements face this same challenges, in microcosm as does Iraq. The question of how to incorporate Islamic values into a modern, accountable structure of governance and jurisprudence. Many regional eyes are on Iraq, some in anticipation of the impact of success and others in fear of that potential success. For the U.S. to be seen, in the end,  as the midwife of a successful Iraqi democracy would send the most powerful message possible to repressive regimes in the region.

The Middle Eastern political landscape is very much about messages, hints, shadows of meanings and symbolism. The power of a stable Iraq sends many messages and powerful points of symbolism. In the best case it is the locus for change in a region desperately in need of it; in the worst case it reinforces the fear that the evolution of democratic institutions is either not possible or simply too costly.      

Source: D3 Systems of Vienna VA. & DA Research Ltd or Istanbul Turkey. for ABC News, The BBC, ARD and NHK.

Interviews were conducted in Arabic from a random national sample of 2,2228 Iraqis aged 18 and up.  Statistical confidence level represented at 95%. 

 

This posting will address a March 2008 poll of the Iraqi people. Identification of source Material follows below.

In most cases, the relative change in opinion dynamics noted here is a comparative to February 2007. This comparative is intended to mirror the changes in Iraqi perceptions that are likely associated with the U.S. Surge in troop levels and strategic redirection. For simplicity sake and as a more general basis for analysis the better or somewhat better responses are combined and compared to the combined worse or much worse ratings.

The U.S. Role:

There are a variety of disconnects and conflicts in Iraqi opinion related to the U.S. role in Iraq. It is likely that reasonable observers would expect that to be the case. The situation is complex and occurs within the context that no country or people “enjoy” the reality of an occupation, most especially a Muslim country occupied by a Christian country. There is a genuine fear that historical events could repeat themselves. However, there is also a sense that “we are where we are” and the need exists to accept certain realities to motivate improvements.

In light of U.S. difficulties in terms of service delivery and economic development, the favorability ratings related to “U.S. carrying out their responsibilities in Iraq” question are predictable but represents an improving trend line. In 2007, the “very/quite good job” rating was 24%, currently improved to 29%. However, in terms of the worst rating category, “very bad job”, U.S. ratings have improved from 46% “very bad” to 35% “very bad”, a 24% improvement in a year’s time.

The numbers of Iraqis that support the U.S. presence has remained consistent, 22% in 2007 and 26% in 2008. Those that oppose U.S. presence have moved from 78% to 72% currently. The improvement in U.S. presence numbers is statistically, not material within the context of the opposed relationship despite the marginal improvement.

However, and here is where disconnects begin to appear; only 38% of Iraqis want the U.S. out now, about half of the number that opposes the U.S. presence. There appears to be a sense of real politic present in Iraqi thinking. 62% of Iraqis want the U.S. to remain in Iraq under a variety of circumstances ranging from “until security is restored” to “never leave” with “never leave” representing only 1% of the responses. Iraqis clearly want the U.S. to leave but they do not want the U.S. to leave them in a mess. The percentage of Iraqis that want the U.S. to leave immediately has declined from 47% in August of 2007 to the current 38%.          

More disconnected opinion is present when the question of what the security situation would be the case if the U.S. left Iraq entirely. Nearly half, 46% think the security situation would actually improve and only 29% see it getting worse. 

Disconnects deepen; when asked whether the U.S. should or should not play a role in specific areas of responsibility in Iraq the responses illustrate the seriously conflicted opinions of Iraqis:

Should the U.S. provide weapons and training to the Iraqi Army, 76% say yes. 

Should the U.S. provide financial aid for reconstruction, 73% say yes.

Should the U.S. provide ongoing security assistance related to Iran 68% say yes. Should the U.S. provide ongoing security assistance related to Turkey, 66% say yes.

Should the U.S. participate in operations against Al Qaeda and foreign Jihadists, 80% say yes! 

The Iraqis appear to have concluded that while their own security forces are improving they are not fully capable of responding to the threats that have presented themselves.

The Iraqis want the U.S. out but not right away and certainly not right now! It is clear that they have both a desire to see the U.S. out and a clear perception of the regional threats that an insecure Iraq would face from a variety of sources in the absence of a U.S. presence. 

Iraqis have evolved a definitive opinion of what Al Qaeda will represent should Al Qaeda be allowed to reestablish itself as a major force in Iraq. Iraqis are clearly rejecting that eventuality while welcoming ongoing U.S. participation in defeating Al Qaeda.

Perhaps, the seriously conflicted opinions regarding the U.S. role and the trend lines associated with those opinions reflect a number of dynamics. It could be that Iraq is exhausted by conflict, terrorism, sectarian issues and are seeing their way clear to accept the conditions as the most likely path to stability. It could also be the case that the changes in U.S. strategy both militarily and diplomatically represent an evolving U.S. presence that is not acceptable, just more acceptable. More acceptable is likely all we could have expected in a year’s time.

Source: D3 Systems of Vienna VA. & DA Research Ltd or Istanbul Turkey. for ABC News, The BBC, ARD and NHK.

Interviews were conducted in Arabic from a random national sample of 2,2228 Iraqis aged 18 and up. Statistical confidence level represented at 95%. 

 

This posting will address a March 2008 poll of the Iraqi people. Identification of source Material follows below.

In most cases, the relative change in opinion dynamics noted here is a comparative to February 2007. This comparative is intended to mirror the changes in Iraqi perceptions that are likely associated with the U.S. Surge in troop levels and strategic redirection. For simplicity sake and as a more general basis for analysis the better or somewhat better responses are combined and compared to the combined worse or much worse ratings.

General Conditions:

The changes in Iraqi perceptions of their living conditions and the associated expectations for the future is as crucial a dynamic in evaluating the overall impact of recent efforts by the U.S. and Iraqi Governments as can be. If the perception of improvement in general conditions remain static, the security strategy fails and opens the door for the Iraqi people to pursue more draconian options. The prior posting addressed security specific issues; there can be no doubt that what follows is very much integrated with those perceptions.

The context of Iraqi perceptions is reasonably represented by the first survey question; “In your life, are things better or worse?” 54% say better as compared to 39% a year ago, a 38% improvement. Those responding that their personal conditions are “very bad” declined from 28% to 16%. The general “bad” categories in 2007 saw 60% of Iraqis falling into that category, today that number is 45%. It can be argued that these are not exceptional results. However, they can also be fairly judged as a major movement for a year’s time. That movement is especially striking in the context of polling done in 2005 that saw 67% of Iraqis feeling that there circumstances were highly unfavorable.  Versus 2005, there is an improvement of 318% in the worst rating categories.

Also telling are Iraqi expectations for a year from now. A year ago, that question was responded to favorably by 39% of respondents today 54% of Iraqis expect things to be better in their personal lives a year from now.

Non-security concerns related to how Iraqis see the major issues in their personal lives are dominated by economic and utility delivery issues. Assuming that the 8% growth projected for the Iraqi economy actually materializes and that the security conditions continue to improve the economic issues should mitigate over the next year. The current and expected economic growth in Iraq is a likely the basis for the optimism noted above. Utility distribution remains an issue of basic and persistent concern and requires a solution as a foundation for continuing improvement in the overall perception of the effectiveness of the Iraqi government.  It should also be expected that insurgent elements would attempt to insure slow progress on these issues. Utility distribution, sanitation, clean water and street rubble are concerns with electricity being primary. 

When asked if things would be better for the country in a year the opinion change was favorable by 15% and the “much worse” category declined from 13% in 2007 to 7% in 2008. 

The Iraqis seem to be connecting their personal circumstances to the overall conditions in the country. The importance of this connected perception is supportive of a possible mitigation of tribal focus and recognition that Iraq as an independent country is in fact viable.

While Iraqis seem to be reasonably optimistic about the short-term future, they are less so in the context of questions related to whether or not things will be better for their children. Compared to last year there was only an 18% improvement related to whether Iraqis feel their children will be better off than they are. However, there has been a 33% decline in those responding that their children will be worse off. The number of those that felt that it would be “about the same” grew by 24%. This is somewhat, inconsistent with their short-term view but in light of the fragile nature of progress and the remaining threats it is not difficult to rationalize and appreciate.

When asked about general conditions for the country as a whole, favorability ratings also improved from 35% in 2007 to 43% in 2008.   There was, again, a steep decline from 28% who believed things were “very bad” to 20% who thought so. 

The survey addresses a long list of specific areas of opinion with reasonably consistent results in the context of the general opinions represented in preceding sections. There are, however, some notable and important exceptions. Local schools favorability ratings improved from 43% to 63% in a year’s time, an improvement of 47%. Basic availability of household goods improved from 38% to 65%, family economics improved from 36% favorable to 57% favorable. Nearly a third of respondents said their family economic situation had improved over the past year. It makes one wonder how many countries have a third of their population representing improving personal economic conditions over the past year? Granted, comparatives begin from a low value but this set of responses is crucial to the overall Iraqi perception of improvement.

There are key questions that mirror the U.S. debate over Iraqi benchmarks, three are addressed here. The Iraqi perceptions related to a legislative resolution related to sharing Oil profits sees 53% of the opinion that the legislature is willing to do so and 46% thinking not. Reconciliation between ethnic and religious groups is a 50/50 proposition within the margin of error and reduction of corruption tilts slightly to the opinion that the legislature is unwilling to do what is necessary.   

It seems clear that confidence in local institutions exceeds confidence in the central government. Given the overall dynamics of the past four years, it is reasonable to assume that Iraqis are in a wait and see mode relative to the effectiveness of the central government on these issues. Considering the movement in other categories over the past year the Iraqi government seems to be lagging behind grass roots movements. There have been a number of indications over the past year that grass roots reconciliation would lead, not follow, the reconciliation process and it appears that this survey supports that perception.

There is a clear desire by Iraqis to remain where they are. The question asked within the security context was whether or not they would move to another area of Iraq saw 78% saying they would not. A similar question related to moving to a different country saw 64% as satisfied with Iraq. Of those that said, they would move to another country only half actually had any plans to do so. Interesting as well, when asked is Iraqis who fled the violence should return now 54% responded that it was not the right time for them to do so. 

As was the case with security issues, Iraqis see conditions improving but are reluctant to project the improvement far into the future. There is a clear concern with central government leadership and a degree of skepticism related to the potential effectiveness of the current government. Considering the number of factions present in Iraq this concern is likely well founded.

There was no polling, as was the case with security issues, about who deserved blame or credit, therefore some degree of blind interpretation is required. It is likely not a stretch to posit that grassroots and local efforts are more favorably viewed than are the efforts of the central government. Again, it does not appear possible to separate the positive impact of the U.S. anti insurgency strategy from the perceptions of improvements in general conditions. 

It is also the case that only a short time ago the Iraqi government began to mirror U.S. efforts to focus more specifically on local issues as they reorganized their own reconstruction efforts under a new cabinet officer.

It appears that Iraqis see some light at the end of this long tunnel but are reluctant to give in to overly optimistic expectations for the future. 

Source: D3 Systems of Vienna VA. & DA Research Ltd or Istanbul Turkey. for ABC News, The BBC, ARD and NHK.

Interviews were conducted in Arabic from a random national sample of 2,2228 Iraqis aged 18 and up. Statistical confidence level represented at 95%. 

 

This posting will address a March 2008 poll of the Iraqi people. Identification of source Material follows below.

In most cases, the relative change in opinion dynamics noted here is a comparative to February 2007. This comparative is intended to mirror the changes in Iraqi perceptions that are likely associated with the U.S. Surge in troop levels and strategic redirection. For simplicity sake and as a more general basis for analysis the better or somewhat better responses are combined and compared to the combined worst or much worst ratings.

Security:

When asked to identify the single biggest problem in your life 25% of Iraqis identified one of five security related issues in the poll. 24% identified economic issues and 15% utility delivery. Of the 32 response categories, 24 showed results and only two reached double digits: electricity and unemployment. The security concerns were equally mixed with no dominant response in any one category as it related to the individual. 

When the same question was asked in terms of the country as a whole the identification of security issues showed an increase to 38% followed by 11% of the respondents concerned about regional foreign influence as the major problem facing the country. 

Interestingly, only 6% pointed to U.S. presence as the major issue facing the country. Of the double digit responses both were related to security, one in terms of general security and the other related to terrorism. These two concerns represented 25% of the responses. While other issues are clearly of concern to Iraqis they seem to be aware that improved security will form the context within which other issues must be addressed. They also appear to be identifying terrorism as a primary issue. It is fascinating that the perception of terrorism as the major issue facing the country is double the responses related to U.S. presence as a primary problem. There were 33 categories of possible answers with 26 showing results.

In comparative terms when asked about local security conditions 62% identified the situation as good. The prior year that was response was 47%. Those responses represent a 36% improvement over the perception that existed a year prior. Another point of interest is that the percentage of Iraqis who identified the local security situation as “very bad” dropped from 32% in February of 2007 to 12% in March of 2008, the “very bad” rating improved by 167% over a year’s time.

Interesting dynamics also appear when Iraqis are asked who shares the blame or credit for the security situation (these comparatives are March 2008 vs. August 2007).   There is a clear progression in these comparatives: The overall context of the question is that In August of 2007 72% of Iraqis identified the security situation as improved. In March of 2008 62% thought it had improved over the conditions present in August indicating a reasonably strong trend of positive momentum and consistent with the “very bad” rating in the prior paragraph. 

Who is responsible for the improvement? Of those that identify the situation as improved, 31% identify the Iraqi Army and Police with another 26% saying the Iraqi Government resulting in 57% identifying government institutions as the responsible parties for the improvement. While there is no prior period comparative, a growing confidence in Iraqi instructions can only serve to help stabilize the security conditions further. Another 8% identify the Awakening Councils, only 5% identify the Mahdi Army as a responsible party. As you might note there is 30% left, that 30% was identified in the poll as “Other”. As the U.S. forces are not specifically identified, it may be reasonable to assume that “Other” is actually U.S. forces. If that assumption is correct the combination of the U.S. forces and Iraqi institutions are perceived to represent 87% of the improvement in security conditions.

On the other hand, of those who identified the situation as worst, only 20% identify U.S. forces and operations as the culprit. Combining responses that include Militias, Political Parties and their Militias and the Iraqi Government result in 51% of Iraqis blaming those entities for a worsening of the security situation. Al Qaeda is blamed by 9% of respondents and neighboring countries by 6% of respondents.  

Interestingly, the comparatives to 2007 related to confidence in the Iraqi Army and Police is essentially the same now, within the margin of error. This, despite polling that demonstrates strong feelings that the Army and Police are responsible for the improvement in the general security situation.

While confidence in U.S. forces occurs at very low numbers, there is a change here as well. In 2007, 18% expressed confidence in U.S. forces with 52% expressing “no confidence at all”. In 2008, the confidence number rose to 20% and the “no confidence at all” declined to 46%. Small improvements to be sure but somewhat representative of a trend as the “no confidence at all” rating in 2005 was 55%. 

Local Militias are taking a hit in Iraqi public opinion. Confidence in local militias has dropped from 36% to 22% a decline of 63% in that category. The “no confidence at all” rating for local Militias has gone from 38% in 2007 to 47% in 2008 a 24% decline. This, in combination with other issues seems to represent a moving away from dependence on local militias as a failed approach that has to evolve from a focus on local security to a greater reliance on existent security institutions.

It is also interesting to note that the confidence in Awakening Councils is reasonably strong with 56% expressing confidence. It is clear that Awakening Councils and the Militia’s are viewed very differently with Awakening Councils more than doubling the favorability ratings of Militias. Considering that, the Awakening Councils were established within the last year these favorability ratings have to be viewed as very strong especially in contrast to the perception of Militias. 

In light of difficulties in terms of service delivery and economic development, the favorability ratings related to “U.S. carrying out their responsibilities in Iraq” question are somewhat predictable but also represent an improving trend line. In 2007, the “very/quite good job” rating was 24% currently improved to 29%. However, in terms of the worst rating category, “very bad job”, U.S. ratings have improved from 46% “very bad” to 35% very bad, a 24% improvement in a year’s time.

There were a number of questions specifically related to the increased U.S. troop levels in Iraq. These numbers compare polling from August of 2007. The question of security conditions specifically in the areas where additional troops were sent was asked. In 2007, 18% felt that security was better and 70% thought it worse. Currently 36% view security as better and 53% worse, an essential 17 point change from worse to better.

The question was also asked related to “other areas of Iraq” in this case the better rating went from 12% to 30%, the worse rating from 68% to 49%.

The question relating to the presence of U.S. forces’ impact on security in general shows a disconnect as they compare to the prior questions. The better/worse change since August of 2007 shows favorable changes of 9-11 points.

This might be explained by the ratings enjoyed by the Awakening Councils in the context of the understandable desire to identify Iraqis as primary responsible parties for security improvements. 51% of Iraqis feel these Councils have improved security with only 16% of the opinion that they have worsened the security situation. 31% feel they have had no impact, which is understandable in light of the fact that they were initially focused on a single province, and their growth in other areas is only now beginning to escalate.

The bottom line? Iraqis perceive their conditions to be improving as related to security. They are clearly reluctant to provide any considerable measure of credit to U.S. forces. This dynamic is fully understandable in light of the fact that our invasion set the stage for 4 years of essentially worsening security conditions as the rise of Al Qaeda in Iraq, Iranian and Syrian influence and weapons combined with the presence of foreign fighters to create horrific circumstances on the ground. The context also exists that an essentially Christian nation is currently responsible for Iraqi security and this circumstance is grating on Iraqis as it would be on us were the circumstances reversed. 

However, the fact that favorability numbers for U.S. involvements are improving at all in light of the inherent reluctance to view the U.S. in a positive fashion is, hopefully, telling and has set the stage for additional improvements which should they occur could represent a geometric progression of opinion.

The Iraqis are clearly rejecting terrorism as evidenced by their definition of threats and the favorability of Awakening Councils who have been in the front lines of banishing Al Qaeda in Iraq from their regions of responsibility.

From the Iraqi point of view things have improved in the past year in some cases dramatically. It would be intellectually disingenuous to separate the dynamics of The Surge and the associated change in strategy from the Iraqi perception of improvement.

Source: D3 Systems of Vienna VA. & DA Research Ltd or Istanbul Turkey. for ABC News, The BBC, ARD and NHK.

Interviews were conducted in Arabic from a random national sample of 2,2228 Iraqis aged 18 and up. Statistical confidence level represented at 95%.  

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The debate over elitism, who is and who is not, immediately followed by breathless justification of Mr. Obama’s San Francisco comments and whether or not they reflect elitism is laughable. Moments of comic relief are always welcome here.

The idea that having just paid off your school loans as proof that you’re a regular guy does not work. That is just good financial sense, why pay off low interest loans early when your money can be better utilized elsewhere.   Mrs. Obama offers her growing up in a working class neighborhood as proof that elitism does not apply. This argument is a clear disservice to her considerable intellectual prowess; surely, she can do better than that. Or can she?

Elitism has nothing to do with any of that. Elitism is a state of mind, an attitude that while difficult to define to a certainty, is invariably clear when you encounter it. It is the persistent, prevailing attitude that “I/We” know better what is good for "You" than “You” do. That as a card carrying member of the great unwashed, “You” need to just get out of the way, stop whining, and let “I/We” do what “I/We” know is best, things will be better for all of us, just trust us. 

Elitism is evidenced by the demonstration of contrary behaviors. Uncomfortable, difficult to watch engagements with bowling or slugging down a boilermaker is, well…….its just trying too hard.  There is always a message when someone is trying too hard to be exactly what he or she is not.   

More to the point, elitism is, more often than not, ideological and represents a political and social point of view. The discussion of elitism should be a discussion of which ideologies support elitist sensibilities and attitudes and which do not. 

A brief survey of this years campaign comments provides the answers. Proposals have been made by all of the Liberal candidates that we need: more government, more regulation, more redistribution of income, more social programs, more centralized control of the economy, more taxes and more profit engineering for major industries as the menu of answers. In other words, “I/We” know better than “You” do. If you will just let us get on with the economic and social engineering agenda, all problems will be solved in due course. 

Conservatives rely on a different ideological point of view; create the conditions whereby the economy can grow and individuals succeed, reduce the influence of government and allow the market to function as freely as possible. “We” trust “You” to decide what is best for “You”. Yes, you’ll fail on occasion, that is the way of the world and many great lessons are learned in failure. However, the opportunity to try again will always be there and it will always be up to “You”!

One point of view trusts in the inherent good sense of the individual and one does not.   One makes space for the individual and one does not. One looks to a model of significant government intervention and one looks to the value of the individual. One believes that globalized solutions work best and one believes that our values should prevail. 

Elitism by one or the other candidate is not the issue. The ideology that informs and guides their opinions is the issue and there can be no question as to where elitist attitudes prevail. 

 

There is always hope amongst us political geeks that when it comes to a potentially controversial Congressional hearing, something will occur that is obviously worth writing about: Not so much this time around.

Positions on both sides, now ripened over years were postured. Years old rationales and complaints are repeated on both sides. It’s become so repetitively familiar most Americans could probably argue either position just for the fun of being contrary.

What is, once again, striking is the courage of conviction or lack thereof when it comes to the issue of Iraq.

Our Democratic Congressional delegation has had it in their power for the past 15 months to end the war immediately. Or, at the very least, to reduce funding to the point where a severe reduction in troop levels would be mandated by the funding levels. Keep in mind, that a majority of the funding for Iraq has come in the form of supplemental funding requests from the White House outside of the normal budget process requiring specific approval. 

Matching up two days of rhetoric demanding all manner of timelines, troop reductions, plans to reduce troop levels, plans to develop plans, Iraqi accountability, Iraqi reconciliation, political reform, diplomatic surges and a number of other demands that escape short term memory; questions invariably present themselves.

If you are against the war, if you have it in your power to end the war, if you do not, why? Does Congress (Democratic members specifically) lack the courage of their oft stated convictions and if so why?

Do they fear a transition of public perception that moves responsibility from the White House to Congress?

Do they, in fact, know but will not admit, that the consequences of early withdrawal could be catastrophic, and that the responsibility for the potential of impending horror would be theirs?

Do they need to keep the White House on the hot seat for political reasons? Is it critical to a Democratic presidential victory to maintain an anti war position?

Do they, in fact, know full well that the surge is working and simply will not alter their position to recognize it, again for political reasons?

Do they fear their own left wing?

Do they fear yet another defeat by The President who has weathered 60 bills, resolutions, committee hearings, and parliamentary moves aimed at supposedly ending the war. Congress has done everything they could do short of what they have to do the end the war.

Rhetorical questions? Some of the questions apply?  They all apply?  They apply with an explanation, they apply with an excuse? Maybe! The real reason is the American People. They provide the answer to the current Democratic dilemma and apparent lack of conviction, rhetoric aside.

 Americans don’t like the war; they know horrific mistakes were made, they mourn the lives lost, wish, in hindsight, we hadn’t done it. However, we also know that it is what it is. Americans know that the current situation is complex. Americans may or may not process this in great intellectually depth but we do process it instinctually which has always been one of our great strengths as a people.  Despite a clearly biased media there was just enough counterpoint to ignite instinct and some degree of common sense.  

The polls tell the story in this case. The polls have shown a significant disconnect on a fairly consistent basis. While 70% of Americans may say that they are against the war a much smaller number are willing to get out now, no matter what. In some polls the number willing to get out now is half the percentage of those that said they opposed the war.

The boomer generation remembers well Vietnam. That generation has reflected on it for four decades, dealt with a variety of guilt’s, read the histories, accepted the confessions, watched the movies, saw the vets, visited the memorial, heard the commentaries. Self defeat did not work so well back then and they fear it may not work well now. At least that fear is genuine unlike so many of the fears present in Congress.

The American people may come, occasionally, late to the party but in the end they usually get it right. They have it right this time.

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Bush lied! We were taken to war on false pretense! We’ve already lost! The war in Iraq cannot be won!

These comments are, by now, all too familiar and were repeated with determination by many. The talking points were most frequently and dramatically voiced by Leader Reid, Speaker Pelosi and the lemmings who have, mistakenly, followed them down a path to an ever-growing point of political no return on Iraq.

Bush Lied! If President Bush did, in fact, lie about the dangers of Saddam’s Iraq he had a lot of company. A partial list of “others” that clearly and publicly castigated Iraq and warned of the dangers: President Bill Clinton, Senator John Kerry, Madeline Albright, Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden, Bill Richardson and a long list of “others”.

Mr. Obama is quoted saying he did not think Saddam was that great of a threat. This perception, used to justify his ability to make the appropriate judgment demonstrates exactly the opposite. It was a very small island of opinion that did not think Saddam was dangerous. Europe, the U.S., the U.N., NATO and most of his neighbors in the Middle East were agreed on the dangers posed by Saddam, if not the method of resolution. Mr. Obama apparently missed the memo. What other dangers might he miss?  

The War is Lost and cannot be Won!

President Bush can, justifiably, be criticized on a wide variety of fronts related to the conduct of the war. However, in the face of incredible pressure to reduce the American commitment in Iraq he did just the opposite, the surge. Critics, you will no doubt, recall demanded daily a change in strategy and they got it, just not the change they wanted.. 

Now, even according to staunch critics progress is being made. This progress is, to be honest, tenuous. Arab tribes have for centuries “changed sides” based on the expediencies of the moment. Our new found allies could do so again, but for now the lines are holding. A Shiite controlled central government has decided to “take on” a Shiite militia, the Mahdi Army, if that’s not progress I’m not sure what is. 

The moving target of anti war talking points has moved again. Moved from lied to we have already lost to we cannot win to its too expensive. Hopefully, it will be easy for the opposition to hold on the too expensive argument, but then again, maybe not. Perhaps a cogent analysis of the cost of failure appears. The components of that cost analysis might include: rising oil prices, civil war in the absence of U.S. security guarantees, a Turkish invasion of Northern Iraq, no presence as a check on Iran and it’s aspirations for regional dominance and nuclear weapons, a nuclear weapons race including Saudi Arabia and Syria, new aggression against Israel, well the list could go on but you probably get the point. 

More moving target talking points appear: Iraqi Reconciliation must occur, the benchmarks have not been met, we need to deliver the message that the Iraqi Government must perform or we’re out of here, there is no military solution, the surge was supposed to create the space for political reconciliation and it has not!!!   

All true to varying degrees and with caveats. Insurgencies are not resolved with military force alone, a generally accepted principal. However, security conditions must form the basis for potential political solutions. No security no political solution, also a generally accepted principal.

The other, generally accepted principal is that insurgencies are much more of a bottom up than a top down exercise. “Hearts and Minds” is not a function of the central government, no matter who sits in the seat.   One of many flaws in the focus on “benchmarks” for the Iraqi Government is the absence of consideration or analysis of what has to happen to motivate a grassroots movement. In reality it is the grassroots movements that move the central government. General Petraeus has demonstrated stunning progress at the grass roots level. This in tern has pressured the central government. 

Iraqis are coming together to make fundamental decisions on the values that their state will rest on. The Copenhagen Accord is the best example so far. In Iraq and all over the Middle East there are movements attempting to flesh out the balance between tribes, ethnic groups, religion and, yes, democratic principals. Did we have a benchmark for that?  

Do we have a benchmark for the potential importance that a functional, fledgling democracy in Iraq could have on the region? 

(Please look up Robin Wright’s new book “Dreams and Shadows”)

On to the “Benchmarks” and the Iraqi failures. Frederick Kagan, who opposed benchmarks, has periodically published detailed updates on points of military progress in Iraq which have taken the bloom off the “we’re failing” rose, He now he applies the same analysis to the political in the form of evaluating the benchmarks.

On the legislative side there were seven benchmarks, four have been completed, two are in process and one is stalled. The stalled benchmark is related to oil revenue distribution. While legislation has not been completed the reality is that oil revenue is being distributed absent the demanded legislation. The benchmark calling for enacting semi-autonomous regions is stalled. The stall represents second thoughts on behalf of the Iraqis as to the wisdom of proceeding. Hey, it is their country.

According to Mr. Kagan all seven Security Benchmarks have been accomplished and in some cases exceeded.

Government Performance Benchmarks are only one for four, with three in process. A review of the specific benchmark goals cannot help but lead one to question exactly how the empirical measure of progress related to these benchmarks is going to be accomplished. These benchmarks deal with items such as insuring that political authorities are not making false accusations against Security Forces and that minority political parties’ rights are protected. In current day Iraq perhaps the best analysis is that none of those parties are happy.

In the event that the benchmarks are materially accomplished, security progress continues and we come to see the expense of failure what will be the next set of talking points?  Hard to know, outside of absolute confidence in the creativity of our political class when it comes to justifying their residence on a political tree branch that is about to break!