The NATO alliance is fast approaching the point where persistent, underlying problems will appear at the surface. The alliance faces seminal challenges, which could unhinge the basic formulations of the alliance. 

After September 11, for the first time, NATO invoked Article V. Article V applies the “attack against one member is an attack against all” provision. The U.S., for a variety of reasons, took the decision not to involve NATO in Afghanistan in any significant fashion at that time.

Now that the United States has attempted to engage NATO in Afghanistan a series of long recognized disconnects between the U.S. and its allies have come to the fore. The vast majority of NATO nations engaged in Afghanistan are not authorized by their governments to engage in combat operations, only in reconstruction efforts. While the number of NATO troops on the ground should be sufficient to the task the number is misleading and the task of engaging The Taliban in the only manner The Taliban understands goes begging. Notable exceptions are the Dutch, Canadians, British who have fought bravely, and well. However, the posture of other NATO allies is illustrated clearly by the U.S. decision to send an additional 3,500 U.S. Marines to Afghanistan. It is further illustrated by NATO nations continuing reluctance to approve changes in their military authorizations for combat related troop deployments.

The question presents itself: is an attack on one NATO nation, truly an attack on all? If NATO constituents are politically unable to respect and support the application of Article V provisions it becomes a matter of simple logic to question the validity of the alliance and the massive resources that have been committed to it.  

Additional questions present themselves: Is this an alliance in the true sense of an alliance or simply an inexpensive way for Europe to insure European security? It is also valid to wonder if our self-interest is being served by our commitment to NATO?

The disconnect is clearly evidenced by the “approved” activities of most of the NATO allies in Afghanistan and is fundamental. European attitudes on display in Afghanistan are the same ones that were on display during their failed efforts in the Balkan crisis. The belief that facilitation and never ending diplomatic engagement can overcome the evils inherent in any situation was disproved in that situation. The have been further disproved in the five year long negotiations with Iran and tragic failures in Darfur. 

While the blind faith in diplomacy is laudable in an esoteric sense, the facts on the ground argue that limiting a military force to reconstruction as a path to reconciliation and victory is chimera.  Frederick the Great famously contended, “Diplomacy without arms is like music without instruments”. The reconstitution of The Taliban has been, in part, a function of music without instruments. This year, offensive operations by The Taliban have increased by 25% and once again, an additional commitment of U.S. combat troops is necessary if failure is to be avoided.

There are other points of evidence in demonstration of the risk averse nature of the modern continental European states. In the aftermath of the Israeli, Hezbollah war in Lebanon last summer the world looked to the French, based on their longstanding relations with Lebanon, to provide a stabilization force. As two dozen French medical personnel, “stormed the beach” in Beirut the disappointment was almost palpable.

The Dayton Accords to resolve the Balkan conflict was a case of American bombing and diplomatic bullying to resolve what should have been a European issue. The Europeans declared it a European issue but were impotent in exercising their moral authority and fearful of military engagement in support of policy.

The fundamental disconnect is philosophical. Americans believe that the sacrifice of blood and treasure to defeat an enemy such as The Taliban is a worthy undertaking. Sacrifice as the means to offer to others the freedoms we enjoy is noble. Europeans, after decades of Social Democracy, the domination of moral equivalency as an accepted norm and an evolution away from traditional Judeo-Christian ideals, do not see it that way. Continental Europeans demonstrate a dramatic, indeed arrogant reluctance to sacrifice in a significant fashion to extend the same blessings of democracy to others that they enjoy. It may be their undoing in more ways than one. 

I have long quoted a former boss of mine who contended that there are “no good deals without good partners”. Experience has proven him correct time and time again. Regardless of how much money is on the table, evidence that partners might not share the same ethical foundation or philosophy as you do is reason enough to run for the proverbial hills.