THE WRONG STORY LINE ON THE NIE:

D.E. Landry

December 5, 2007

Our media has, once again, missed the real story of the NIE regarding Iran.  The media focus for the past two days has been on what the President knew and when he knew it.  That is not the outline of the real story and is one more example of how poorly we are served by our news media.  The real story should be how much credibility the report has both empirically and in relation to past “Intelligence Community” (IC) conclusions.  Although not reported to any significant extent a little research will reveal the following.

1.      The IAEA does not buy the American assessment 100% to quote an unnamed “senior official.  If the IAEA, of all people, doesn’t buy the report’s conclusions maybe we should rein in the runaway horse for a moment.  The U.S. has been continually critical of the IAEA’s “soft” approach to Iranian issues, for the IAEA to dispute the findings is significant and needs to be a part of the story.

2.      More from the IAEA.  The IAEA has recently confirmed that Iran’s claims of having completed construction of 3,000 centrifuges is true.  This capability will provide enough highly enriched uranium for at least one nuclear weapon per year. Israeli intelligence is of the opinion that 2008 is the critical year for stopping Iran before it crosses the finish line.

3.      Israel officially disputes the conclusions of the NIE.  Without question, amongst democratic nations Israel’s intelligence infrastructure is the best there is.  They are the only friend of the West with even the remote possibility of having live intelligence assets on the ground in Iran. A quote from an unnamed Israeli senior official: "If one looks at the investment, if one looks at the nature of the project, if you look at the cost to the Iranian economy, there is no logical explanation other than that the Iranian program is not benign." Further the Israelis insist: “that there is as little as two years to stop Iran from going nuclear.” No nation on earth is as much in jeopardy than Israel and one must assume that Iran represents a particular focus for Israel.  Israel has long warned the U.S. of a parallel “black” weapons program in Iran.  The NIE makes no such mention.

4.      Experts have opined that the NIE appears to be focused on analysis of Iranian “intentions”.  There is no more amorphous basis for intelligence analysis that “intentions”.  This manner of analysis would tend to indicate that “hard” sources are absent.  

5.      The chorus of voices that find fundamental fault with the trail of logic that leads to the headline conclusions of the NIE continues.  The significant possibility that the U.S. has been, once again, duped by Iran is worth frank discussion.  That discussion has been glaringly absent in the mass media as the temptation to further deteriorate President Bush’s credibility appears much more important than a cogent debate on the validity of the NIE and the potentially severe repercussions of the report.

6.      The possibility of a political double standard is also in play.  No less an authority than Kenneth Timmerman reports on the individuals involved in production of the report.  He reports on their political backgrounds, policy leanings and professional failures.  Mr. Timmerman’s reporting, again, and at the least, represents a valid point of discussion and debate.  I’ve not heard any such discussion.  If it was wrong to cook intelligence on Iraq for political expediency on the right than it could be also be wrong to cook it on the left.  Our journalistic infrastructure should pursue this possibility with at least as much fervor as they have related to intelligence failures regarding Iraq, to fail to do so further exposes potential bias of a monumental nature when national security, relations with allies and nuclear proliferation are at stake.    

7.      Did anyone notice that the NIE recommends diplomatic policy imperatives.  It is not the role of the IC to make policy recommendations and where this has been the case in the past no good has come of it.  The IC’s job is to provide information and unbiased analysis of that information.  The NIE fails on this point and exposes the potential that the IC bureaucracy has an agenda that they intended to fulfill with this document. The dangers that Iran represents are too significant for an agenda driven NIE.

8.      A wide variety of analysts  have pointed out a significant number of inconsistencies with the NIE.  This divergence of opinion is essentially absent from media reporting with some notable exceptions such as The Washington Post.  Experts aside, the fact is that even those with no more than the ability to follow a trail of logic can find fault with the NIE conclusions.

9.      Considering that Iran has essentially eliminated a variety of potential intelligence sources over the last few years the magical emergence of “new sources” has to be looked at askance.  Keeping in mind the significant disinformation campaign by Saddam Hussein in advance of the Iraqi invasion and how fully duped the intelligence community was by it.  This one smells the same.  Add to that a reported Iranian defector providing such dramatic information on the Iranian nuclear program that France altered it’s policy toward Iran! 

10.  Where does self interest lie?  It is clearly in Iran’s self interest for this NIE to be presented in the manner it has.  To separate the U.S. from it’s alliances and isolate the U.S. politically has long been an Iranian goal.  This NIE does a wonderful job of setting the foundation for exactly that eventuality.  The result of this of separation will be an essential elimination of the possibility of more significant sanctions.  It also crates the framework within which the Iranians could “resume” their nuclear efforts in the context of invalidated U.S. concerns.  That could well buy enough time for them to get where they want to go.  This possibility will actually work in the inverse of those that call for negotiations and engagement as the answer to the problem.  If Iran crates the necessary space to complete the goal of assembling a nuclear weapon, (which the NIE does not address to a certainty)  avoids sanctions, casts U.S. policy in doubt then military engagement and the significant costs of that strategy will become the only remaining option.  

The bottom line here is that there are valid questions and points of debate related to this NIE.  This should not be political, although it will be.  It should be about the validity of the work product, the sources and methods applied and it’s impact on our national security concerns.  There is no more significant national security issue than the possibility of Iran with a nuclear capability.